


























Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of requirements for the MSc in 


















This dissertation investigates the effect of bankruptcies on the industry performance, focusing 
on the bankrupt firm’s competitors. We test whether the market reacts only on the day of the 
filling to Chapter 7 (as proven in the previous literature) or if the market also reacts on the day 
of the effective bankruptcy. In industries with a low degree of competition there is a statistically 
significant decrease in the industry’s returns during a 11 days period (being the 6th day, the day 
when the firm is delisted from the stock market), with an average daily return of -0.137%. The 
same happens for industries with a high degree of competition, with an average daily return of 
-0.081%. Industry 6000 – “Finance, Insurance and Real Estate” presents the best results to 
provide evidence for the hypothesis that the market reacts on the announcement and on the 
effective day of the bankruptcy, with an average excess return for the 3 days (being the 2nd day, 
























Nesta dissertação é investigado o efeito das falências no desempenho da indústria, com foco 
nos concorrentes da empresa falida. A hipótese é se o mercado reage apenas no dia do 
preenchimento do capítulo 7 (conforme provado na literatura anterior) ou se o mercado também 
reage no dia efetivo da falência. Nas indústrias com baixo grau de concorrência, há uma 
diminuição estatisticamente significativa dos retornos da indústria durante o período de 11 dias 
(sendo o 6º dia, o dia em que a empresa é retirada da bolsa), com um retorno médio diário de   
-0,137%. O mesmo ocorre para indústrias com elevado grau de concorrência, com retorno 
médio diário de -0,081%. O setor 6000 - “Finanças, Seguros e Imobiliário” apresenta os 
melhores resultados para evidenciar a hipótese de que o mercado reage ao anúncio e no dia 
efetivo da falência, com retorno excedente médio nos 3 dias (sendo o 2º dia, o dia em que a 
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It has been proven before that, on average, a bankruptcy announcement has a strong negative 
effect on the value of the filing firm’s stock (Altman, 1969; Clark and Weinstein, 1983). This 
decrease on the stock prices is usually linked to the increase in the present value of bankruptcy 
cost. Yet, the stock price reaction does not reveal if the bankruptcy effects are firm-specific or 
industry-wide. Bernanke (1983) and Lang and Stulz (1992) claim that a bankruptcy is 
contagious within an industry. This claim is based on two facts: (i) a bankruptcy announcement 
reveals negative information about the components of cash-flow that are common to all firms 
in the industry, and consequently, decreases market’s expectations of the profitability of the 
industry’s firms; (ii) after a firm’s bankruptcy, suppliers and customers fear that other firms 
inside the industry will follow the path and so makes them worse off.  
Lang and Stulz (1992) found that, on average, the market value of a value-weighted portfolio 
of the common stock of the bankrupt firm’s competitors decreases 1% at the time of the 
bankruptcy announcement and this decline is statistically significant. This effect is even higher 
for highly leveraged industries (debt-to-asset ratio above the sample median): the value of 
competitors’ equity drops by almost 3% on average. Yet, if the bankruptcy announcement 
redistributes wealth from the bankrupt firm to their competitors, it can increase the value of the 
non-bankrupt firms in the industry (Altman, 1984). Lang and Stulz (1992) found that in a low 
leverage industry, with a high concentration level (using the Herfindahl index of industry 
concentration as a proxy for the degree of imperfect competition), the value of the bankrupt 
firm competitors’ equity actually increased by 2.2% on average. On the other hand, industries 
with high leverage and high degree of competition, the value of competitors’ equity drops to 
3.2% on average. The authors provide evidence that a bankruptcy announcement has both a 
competition and contagion effect on other firms inside an industry. 
However, I am interested in studying the effect on the industry performance on the moment the 
firm is extinguished, meaning I am using the 5 days before and after industry returns when the 
bankruptcy occurs. With this, I intend to see if there is any effect on the industry returns after a 
firm extinguish and if yes, to see whether it was caused by contagion, competition, information, 
counterparty or cascade effect. However, some effects cannot be measured through my 
regression: information, cascade and counterparty. Information effects as found before by 
Chakrabarty and Zhang (2012), only intensify the effects, meaning that alone they do not cause 
a meaningful impact on the returns of an industry. Knowing that cascade effects happen 
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whenever a firm’s bankruptcy is followed by another firm’s bankruptcy, caused by the business 
ties between the two firms, my regression will not be able to capture this effect. Counterparty 
effect is caused by business ties between firms from different industries and due to this fact, I 
will not be able to capture this effect on my regression (limited information on the databases 
used concerning this type of data). If there is no effect on the returns, it means the market had 
already adjusted at the moment of the filling on Chapter 7: it controls the process of asset 
liquidation in United States (a trustee is appointed to liquidate nonexempt assets to pay 
creditors; after the proceeds are exhausted, the remaining debt is discharged).  
Banks’ failures will not be covered in this dissertation since there are heavily regulated due to 
the consequences they can have on the economy of the country where the bankruptcy happened. 
Moreover, most banks file for Chapter 11 which can also be called rehabilitation bankruptcy. 
This gives the firm the opportunity to reorganize its debt and to try to reemerge as a healthy 
organization, meaning the firm will contact its creditors in an attempt to change the terms on 
loans, such as the interest rate and dollar value of payments. Also, some banks can be acquired 
by other operating banks while selling their ‘bad’ assets to the government – the so called ‘too 
big to fail policy’. The government assures the major part of the debt in order to avoid 
catastrophic consequences to the country’s economy. For instance, in the United States, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation closely follows the bank failures: in 2019, four banks 
failed – City National Bank of New Jersey, Resolute Bank, Louisa Community Bank and The 
Enloe State Bank. However, other banks assumed the operations of the failed banks whilst the 
United States government assumed part of the ‘bad’ assets in order to avoid a higher negative 
impact to the economy. Since the complexity of this type of bankruptcies is extreme, this 
dissertation will not cover them. 
As previously mentioned, I intend to see if there is any effect on the industry returns after a 
firm is extinguished and, if yes, to see whether it was caused by contagion or competition. These 
effects are defined as follows.  
The contagion effect can be defined as the change in competitors’ value which cannot be 
attributed to wealth redistribution from the bankrupt firm. If one views a firm as a portfolio of 
investments that its true value is not known to outside investors, a bankruptcy filing exposes 
information to outsiders about that value. Knowing that a bankruptcy is costly, the bankrupt 
firm could avoid this situation by raising funds if the value of its investments was higher. The 
other firms inside the industry are expected to have investments with cash-flow characteristics 
very similar to the bankrupt firm. The bankruptcy announcement also carries bad news about 
these firms since the value of their investments is correlated with the value of the bankrupt 
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firm’s investments. For industries with firms with highly similar cash-flow characteristics, it is 
expected the contagion effect to be more impactful than for other industries, all else being equal. 
The bankruptcy announcement, in addition to revealing negative information, can decrease the 
market value of competitors by affecting their dealings with clients, suppliers and regulators. 
For instance, customers with limited information about individual firms in an industry might 
reconsider their perception of the creditworthiness of all firms in the industry. Consequently, 
these firms can experience a fall in demand and a need to advertise their creditworthiness. 
A simple scenario that leads to a competitive effect is as follows: inside an industry with 
imperfect competition, meaning each firm faces an imperfectly elastic demand curve, if one 
assumes that the bankrupt firm suffers an unexpected decrease in demand due to its product 
becoming less attractive comparing to the competitors’ products, it means that this demand 
decrease might result from the bankruptcy itself as an indirect bankruptcy cost or from past 
developments. If the bankruptcy announcement carries information about the demand shift, this 
information is positive for the other firms inside the industry because they have experienced or 
can expect an increase in demand. 
The other effects that will not be tested are defined as follows. 
The counterparty effect will affect the firms who lent money, such as a clients or suppliers 
account, to the bankrupt firm or were exposed to losses from financial market transactions, such 
as through CDS.  
Tangent with the contagion effect, the information effect, by reveling to the market the real 
conditions of the industry where a bankruptcy occur, can lead to the loss of trust by customers, 
regulators, and suppliers and therefore affect the deals other firms intend to do. Once again, it 
can be costly to advertise their creditworthiness, for instance, and the companies inside the 
industry will be harmed by the spread of this type of information. 
Finally, the cascade effect happens whenever a firm’s bankruptcy is followed by another firm’s 
bankruptcy, caused by the business ties between the two firms.  
 
Figure 1 describes channels of contagion. 
 
Figure 1: Channels of Contagion Effect 
The following figures describes the channels of contagion effect after a bankruptcy which can 
be divided into five different effects: contagion, information, competition, counterparty and 
cascade. When a Firm A files for bankruptcy, or defaults, one generally expects negative effects 
for other firms inside the same industry. Contagion effects reflect negative common shocks to 
the forecasts of the industry and might lead to further failures in Industry A. However, the 
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failure of a firm may help its competitors gain market share. Normally, on the other hand, the 
net of these two effects is intra-industry contagion. Contagion effects can also arise across 
industries. Presume that Industry A is a major client of Industry B. The default of Firm A can 
then reveal negative information concerning sales prospects for firms inside Industry B. 
Another channel is the direct counterparty effect. Consider that Firm B has made a loan to Firm 
A. If Firm A defaults, it would cause a direct loss to Firm B, possibly leading to financial 
























The data concerning the bankrupt firms is retrieved from the Center for Research on Security 
Prices (CRSP), with daily frequency. The sample covers the entire US stock market including 
NYSE, AMEX & NASDAQ. All the returns are expressed in USD. Moreover, for the scope of 
my analysis, I obtain the 49 Industry Portfolios from Kenneth R. French Data Library Website, 
including dividends and daily returns. All the excess returns are measured with respect to the 
US treasury-bills also sourced from Kenneth R. French Data Library Website. The final sample 
consists of 152 firms over the time period of January 1990 up to December 2018. 
I found that on the day of the effective bankruptcy all industries present a negative return on 
that day, excluding one industry (“Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary 
Business Conditions 
































service”), and the returns vary between -0.48% on “Services” and -0.05% on “Agriculture, 
Forestry, Fishing, Mining and Construction”. Despite the fact that on the previous and 
subsequent days of the bankruptcy, the returns seem to act randomly- confirming the suspicious 
of the stock market adjusting on the day of the announcement and not on the day of the actual 
bankruptcy- the day 0 presents a negative, or null in one case, return on every industry. 
Also, I checked the 3-day and 11-day performance with the middle day being the day of the 
effective bankruptcy, i.e. no further presence on the stock market. The results for the 11-day 
performance were not consistent between each industry, meaning there was no pattern to 
explore, i.e. the market adjusted the returns on the announcement day. However, apart from 
two industries that presented positive returns (“Manufacturing”, 0.05% and “Wholesale Trade, 
Retail Trade”, 0.10%), the 3-day average return presented negative results, such as -0.31% for 
“Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Mining and Construction” and -0.14% for “Finance, Insurance 
and Real Estate” and “Services”, which may lead to think that the market, despite the 
adjustment seen on 11-day performance, still might react negatively to the extinguish of a firm. 
Through the regression, I found that the amount of leverage chosen by the firm will not have 
impact on the industry performance.  This can be explained by the fact that the lenders of the 
firm are not in the same industry as the bankrupt firm, therefore their competitors will not suffer 
a higher or lower impact depending on the leverage because they do not have this kind of 
business ties, except in the case of banks (which were not analyzed in this dissertation).  
Yet, the ‘Degree of Competition’ matters for the industry performance after a bankruptcy, i.e. 
it is statistically significant. It reduces the industry returns on the effective day of the bankruptcy 
in a presence of a low or high degree of competition by -0.137% and -0.081%, respectively. 
Regarding the industry itself, three reveal a statistically significant negative effect when a 
bankruptcy occurs inside that industry: 3000 – “Manufacturing”, 4000 – “Transportation, 
Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary service” and 5000 – “Wholesale Trade, Retail 
Trade”. In the day of an effective bankruptcy, those industries report a return of -0.185%, -
0.154% and -0.291%, respectively. The constant of the regression is used as a proxy for the 
contagion effect. However, the results show inconsistency with the results found by Lang and 
Stulz (1992): there is no presence of contagion effect on the bankruptcies analyzed. However, 
this research proved partially the competition effect through the variable ‘Degree of 
Competition’, as found by the beforementioned authors. This means that, on this research, I 
was able to prove the negative effect for highly competitive industries in line with Lang and 
Stulz (1992), with the same happening to industries with a low degree of competition as 
opposed to the authors. 
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As previously stated, the objective of this dissertation is to check if the market also reacts to an 
extinction of a firm on the effective day of the bankruptcy or if the market (only) reacts on the 
day of the announcement, as proven by several authors such as Lang and Stulz (1992), paper 
which I based myself for this investigation. Since the day of the announcement can be 
unpredictable, therefore one cannot extract a benefit from it. However, if the market also reacts 
to the extinguish of a firm on the effective day of the bankruptcy (which is known after the 
firm’s filling), there is a possibility to take an advantage of it and believe that is why my work 
can be considered as relevant and, hopefully, profitable. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I expose the previous findings regarding 
bankruptcy events. I present the data and methodology applied for this event study in section 
3. Section 4 covers an extended version of the results and in section 5, I present the concluding 
remarks of this paper. Afterwards there is a section for the appendix, which includes part of the 
data I used for this research and another section containing the detailed references of the works 






















2. Literature Review 
 
The announcement of corporate failure normally carries important information regarding the 
future risk profile and market value of a firm’s shares, such as recovery rate risk (Altman et al., 
2005).  As found by Clark and Weinstein (1983), a bankruptcy announcement might signal 
changes in the probabilities of alternative future share values (bankruptcy increases the 
possibility that the shares will become worthless, for instance). Research to date shows that 
bankruptcy announcements are normally not complete surprises to the market: the market seizes 
a solvency deterioration sign into stock returns much before the event of failure. In reality, 
Aharony et al. (1980) found evidence that shareholders can experience abnormal losses up to a 
period of 4 to 6 years prior to the announcement of bankruptcy (similar results are reported in 
Altman and Brenner, 1981; Pettway and Sinkey, 1980; Shick and Sherman, 1980). Moreover, 
previous literature has reached consensus regarding the effects of a bankruptcy filing on the 
firm’s competitors: the impact is negative (Helwege and Zhang, 2014). On the case of financial 
institutions, if they were not extremely ruled, one bankruptcy could lead to a catastrophic event 
of several bankruptcies followed by the first one (the cascade effect) and consequently a 
financial crisis. Several authors studied this phenomenon, most focusing on the repercussions 
which the failure of the Lehman Brothers brought.  
 
a) Events of bankruptcies on financial firms  
For financial firms, especially the understanding of the cause of the spillover, is less clear. The 
most recent financial crisis renewed the interest of what can happen to other firms when a 
financial institution becomes distressed. The Lehman Brothers, in September 2008, bankruptcy 
evidenced the negative externalities caused by contagion. 
Chakrabarty and Zhang (2012) through this empirical example of a bankruptcy studied the two 
channels of credit contagion: counterparty risk hypothesis versus information transmission 
hypothesis. The first one argues that firms with identifiable financial exposure to the bankrupt 
firm should suffer adverse consequences due to the fundamental business linkage (Davis and 
Lo, 2001). The latter predicts that the failure of a firm causes investors to update their beliefs, 
leading to the financial distress of other firms, even when they do not have direct business 
relationship with the failed firm (Giesecke, 2004; Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Helwege, 
2010). With the results, the authors were able to find that firms with exposure to Lehman 
Brothers experienced greater decreases in liquidity and in information asymmetry, higher price 
impacts of trade, faced higher sell pressure and lower abnormal equity returns than unexposed 
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firms – confirming the counterparty contagion hypothesis. Also, the authors claim that the 
results that pointed for a confirmation of the information transmission hypothesis were mainly 
driven by counterparty exposure, disregarding the abovementioned hypothesis. 
Helwege and Zhang (2014) found that the counterparty contagion affects more larger and riskier 
firms with complex exposures; yet, for banks which face diversification regulations, the 
exposure to counterparty contagion is small and does not cause a cascade of failures. Regarding 
their finding about information contagion, they claim the effects are higher for rivals in the 
same market and have a more notable impact in the presence of distress rather in bankruptcy. 
Regarding counterparty contagion, Allen and Gale (2000), Furfine (2003) and Upper and 
Worms (2004) found that the collapse of one bank causes others to fall in domino-like style due 
to direct business ties, whether they are clients, vendors who are dependent on the business 
contracts, other banks or bondholders who provide capital to the financial institution or the ones 
who become creditors upon a bankruptcy filing. However, many of the financial firms are 
regulated and benefit from “too big to fail” policy. 
Gropp et al. (2003) analyzed bank contagion in a sample of 67 EU banks between 1991 and 
2003. The methodology is built upon Bae et al. (2003) and it is related to the extreme value 
theory, - the behavior of the tail observations for financial market data differs from the other 
observations. They analyzed the properties of three weekly indicators: (i) the simple first 
difference of distance to default to measure the absolute shocks, (ii) the log-difference distance 
to default to measure the percentage shocks and (iii) the abnormal returns for a robustness 
check. With Monte Carlo simulations, a pattern emerged in the tails of the data and, 
independently of the measure used, the results are inconsistent with standard multivariate 
Normal or t-student distributions, suggesting non-linearities. Based on this finding, the authors 
indicate a non-parametric measure called “net contagious influence”. After controlling for bank 
size, they were able to precisely measure the contagion between any bank pair, on condition 
that the probabilities of an idiosyncratic shock hitting the two banks are identical. The results 
are quite sensible for the majority of the banks and the paper shows that there might be tight 
links among banks within countries, along with links connecting the major banking systems in 
Europe. Gropp et al. (2003) claim this paper as a first step towards creating market-based 
indicators of how vulnerable the banking system may be to contagion as the results may provide 
a basis to better understand the extent to which European banking system have become 
interconnected and how banking problems could spread across borders. 
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A general study which included all industries, except banks, was done in 1992 by Lang and 
Stulz. The impact found by the authors differs from the impact caused by financial institutions’ 
failures.  
b) Events of bankruptcy on firms 
As previously mentioned, Lang and Stulz (1992) found that, on average, the market value of a 
value-weighted portfolio of the common stock of the bankrupt firm’s competitors decreases 1% 
at the time of the bankruptcy announcement and this decline is statistically significant. The data 
used by the authors covers the entire United States market between January 1970 and December 
1989. This effect is even higher for highly leveraged industries (debt-to-asset ratio above the 
sample median): the value of competitors’ equity drops by almost 3% on average. However, 
the bankruptcy announcement can increase the value of the non-bankrupt firms in the industry 
by redistributing wealth from the bankrupt firm to their competitors (Altman, 1984). The 
authors found that in a low leverage industry, with a high concentration level, the value of 
competitors’ equity would actually increase by 2.2% on average. On the other hand, industries 
with high leverage and high degree of competition, the value of competitors’ equity drops to 
3.2% on average. Lang and Stulz (1992) deliver evidence that a bankruptcy announcement has 
both a contagion effect and competition effect on other firms within an industry. 
Also, Cheng and McDonald (1996) focused on whether other firms suffer or do not suffer from 
bankruptcy announcements within the same industry- contagion effect. In this study, the 
proposition was that the effects of bankruptcy on other firms can be positive, zero or negative. 
They use the term “ripple effect” instead of contagion effect for negative reactions and 
competitive effect for positive reactions of nonbankrupt firms to describe the possible 
bidirectional effects of bankruptcy announcements. By examining the announcement effects of 
bankruptcy in two industries (the airline and rail-road industries) with very different market 
structures, the authors found that the airline sample received significant positive abnormal 
returns (positive ripple) while the railroad sample experienced significant abnormal losses 
(negative ripple). While, Lang and Stulz (1992) report an insignificant abnormal return for both 
the airline and railroad industries. The positive stock market reaction in the airline sample does 
not support the contagion effect hypothesis documented in the literature (Cheng and McDonald, 
1996). This study theorizes that market structure is an important factor which may greatly 
influence the stock market performance of the survivor sample during bankruptcy 
announcements. 
Moreover, Jorion and Zhang (2006) studied the information transfer effect of credit events 
through the industry, as caught in the stock markets and Credit Default Swaps (CDS), which is 
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important to better understand the counterparty effect. They found that negative correlations 
imply competition effect, while positive correlation across CDS spreads indicate dominant 
contagion effects. Also, they found strong evidence of dominant contagion effects for Chapter 
11 bankruptcies and competition effect for Chapter 7 bankruptcies, confirming, in part, the 
theories previously discussed. The authors used the example of Enron’s failure: investors were 
led to reassess their views of the quality of accounting information from other firms. Collin-
Dufresne, Goldstein and Helwege (2003) showed that this can lead to a contagion risk premium, 
previously defined by Giesecke (2004). Most of the times, a contagion effect indicates positive 


























3. Data & Methodology 
3.1 Data 
The data concerning the bankrupt firms is retrieved from the Center for Research on Security 
Prices (CRSP), with daily frequency. The sample covers the entire US stock market including 
NYSE, AMEX & NASDAQ. All the returns are expressed in USD. Moreover, for the scope of 
my analysis, I obtain the 49 Industry Portfolios from Kenneth R. French Data Library Website, 
including dividends and daily returns. All the excess returns are measured with respect to the 
US treasury-bills also sourced from Kenneth R. French Data Library Website.  
The initial number of observations was 175 over the time period of January 1990 up to 
December 2018. However, it was reduced according to different criteria. Firstly, considering 
that CRSP does not provide data for a bankruptcy, only for delisted firms from the stock market, 
I also had to extract the delisting code which would provide the information regarding if the 
firm were delisted because it went private, was bought by another public traded firm or was 
actually extinguished.  Therefore, I only kept the ones that extinguish, meaning the occurrence 
of a bankruptcy. Then, some firms were too small to cause a meaningful impact on the industry 
performance after their bankruptcy, therefore firms with less than $10 million in liabilities were 
excluded. The final sample consists of 152 firms. 
It is important to notice the lack of the announcement day on the databases used, therefore the 
study focused only on the effective day of the bankruptcy. 
The following figure explains the match made between the bankrupt firms and the 49 Industry 
Portfolios. 
 
Table 1: Number of bankruptcies per industry. 
The following table describes in (1) the industry, which I further refer as sub-industries, division 
made by the 49 Industry Portfolios by Kenneth R. French Data Library Website, in (2) the 
Standard Industrial Classification Code in order to divide each firm into their corresponding 
industry varying between 1000 and 9000, and in (3) the number of bankruptcies per sub-
industry. 
This table includes all the bankruptcies in the United States of America between January 1990 
and December 2018, excluding firms which were too small to cause a meaningful impact on 
the industry performance, i.e. liabilities under $10 million. The number of bankruptcies is 152. 
*Banking industry only includes bankruptcies on the following sub-industries: Finance lessors 







    (1) 
SIC Code 
(2) 
# of bankruptcies 
(3) 
Precious metals 1040 1 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 1310 1 
Construction 1730 2 
Beer and Liquor 2080 1 
Textiles 2250 2 
Printing and publishing 2730 4 
Chemicals 2830 5 
Rubber and Plastic Products  3070 1 
Apparel 3144 1 
Steel Works etc 3312 1 
Construction Materials 3440 4 
Machinery 3560 2 
Computers 3570 6 
Electrical Equipment 3600 12 
Automobiles and Trucks 3710 2 
Aircraft 3720 1 
Shipbuilding & Railroad Equipment 3730 1 
Measuring and Control Equipment 3820 2 
Medical Equipment 3851 1 
Consumers Goods 3860 2 
Transportation 4000 3 
Communication 4840 2 
Utilities 4910 2 
Sanitary services 4950 3 
Steam, air conditioning supplies 4960 1 
Wholesale 5000 4 
Retail 5620 14 
Banking* 6020 15 
Trading 6220 9 
Insurance 6310 3 
Real Estate 6550 3 
Restaurants, Hotels and Motels 7010 1 
Personal Services 7299 4 
Business Services 7310 28 
Entertainment 7810 5 




Following the data cleaning, each firm had a unique day of bankruptcy. With the 49 Industry 
Portfolios, I was able to check the previous and after 5 days performance regarding the day of 
the bankruptcy, by comparing the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC code) to the portfolios 
provided by Kenneth R. French. Also, I used the 49 Industry Portfolios to test if the returns on 
the previous and after 5 days on the moment of a bankruptcy were significant or not.  
Afterwards, in order to compute a regression to see where the effects are originated, further on 
deepened, I extracted the current assets and liabilities, total assets and liabilities, debt and cash 
from Compustat and the returns from CRSP, after merging the two databases through the firms’ 
Permno (a unique permanent company identification number assigned by CRSP to all 
companies with issues on a CRSP File) and Cusip (a number which identifies most financial 
instruments, including: stocks of all registered U.S. and Canadian companies, commercial 
paper, and U.S. government and municipal bonds. Stands for the Committee on Uniform 
Securities Identification Procedures). 
 
3.2 Methodology 
After obtaining the values for each bankrupt firm, I organized them by industry using the 
Standard Industrial Classification Code (SIC code) and afterwards I simply averaged the returns 
for each day within each industry, obtaining this way the average daily return for the time span 
in analysis: the previous and after 5 days of an effective bankruptcy. 
The following figure describes the industry division made.  
 
Table 2: Standard Industrial Classification division. 
The following table demonstrates the 49 Industry Portfolios by Kenneth R. French Data Library 
Website comprised into the Standard Industrial Classification. 
 
Industry SIC code 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Mining and Construction 1000 
Manufacturing 2000/3000 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary service 4000 
Wholesale Trade, Retail Trade 5000 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 6000 
Services 7000/8000 




With these values, I was able to see if the effect was negative or positive per day per industry. 
Then, I averaged the daily values, obtaining the 11-day excess return, being the 6th day, the 
effective day of the bankruptcy. Also, I was interested in checking the effect for a shorter time 
span: the 3-day average return. Therefore, I used the 2nd day as the effective day of the 
bankruptcy. 
To check whether the returns are statistically significant or not on the period of a bankruptcy, I 
compared to a non-event industry performance, using the 49 Industry Portfolio. Two methods 
were used for this check: (i) the average return of the industry on the year of the bankruptcy, 
ignoring the if there were more bankruptcies on that year and (ii) five random samples of 11 
days, excluding the previous and after 5 days of a bankruptcy. However, the first method could 
capture other significant events and, consequently, would biased the returns of the industry on 
that year; consequently, the five random samples of 11 days method prevail over the average 
return of the industry on the year of the bankruptcy. However, both methods matched most the 
results and the notable differences were on the statistically significance at 1, 5 or 10%, which 
once again the second method prevailed. 
After this, I am able to extract the effects on the returns of the industry after a bankruptcy and 
to discuss whether the effect is caused by contagion or competition with a regression fitted for 
this event study. 
As mentioned before, some effects cannot be measured through my regression: information, 
cascade and counterparty. Information effects as found before by Chakrabarty and Zhang 
(2012), only intensify the effects, meaning that alone they do not cause a meaningful impact on 
the returns of an industry. Knowing that cascade effects happen whenever a firm’s bankruptcy 
is followed by another firm’s bankruptcy, caused by the business ties between the two firms, 
my regression will not be able to capture this effect. Counterparty effect is caused by business 
ties between firms from different industries and due to this fact, I will not be able to capture 
this effect on my regression (limited information on the databases used concerning this type of 
data). 
Competition effects can be measured through the coefficient of the dummy variable ‘Degree of 
Competition’, which was divided into low, medium and high. To determine whether the degree 
of competition in a specific industry is low, medium or high, I used the data from United States 
Census Bureau where it is mentioned the concentration of sales and revenues for each industry 
and therefore, I used it as a proxy (Carlton and Perloff, 1990; Cowling and Waterson, 1976) for 
the competition inside each industry and then divided into the three categories beforementioned. 
Since contagion effects can be defined as the change in competitors’ value which cannot be 
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attributed to wealth redistribution from the bankrupt firm, this effect will be measured by the 
regression’s constant, following Lang and Stulz (1992) method. Also, for the regression I 
included the following variables: ‘Current Ratio’ to check the ability of a firm to pay its short-
term obligation; ‘Leverage Ratio’, which is divided into low, medium and high, as a 
measurement for how much capital comes in the form of debt; an ‘Industry Dummy’ to 
understand the specific behavior of each industry; ‘Cash over Debt’ to determine whether the 
company can pay all of its debts if they were due immediately and ‘Assets Over Liabilities’ to 
see the coverage of a firm’s assets to its obligations were also included on the regression. 
For the variables ‘Current Ratio’, ‘Cash over Debt’ and ‘Assets over Liabilities’, I expect the 
higher they are, the higher will be the returns generated through these variables. Concerning 
the ‘Leverage Ratio’, the lower it is the better for the influence on the returns due to the fact 
that these firms are a few days from bankruptcy and less debt they have the easier for them to 
pay to their creditors and therefore, will be a lower leakage of negative information about the 
firm’s and industry common cash-flow, meaning a less negative impact for the returns of the 
other non-bankrupt firms. Regarding the ‘Degree of Competition’ it is expected that in a very 
competitive environment, the old sales of the bankrupt firm will quickly be transferred for 
another firm in the industry and so the effect should be null; however, if the competition inside 
an industry is low, it is possible that a bankruptcy will negatively influence the returns, which 
may be caused by the lost in trust from the clients or investors. In the presence of a contagion 
effect, the repercussions on the returns are expected to be negative, therefore the coefficient of 
the regression’s constant is expected to be negative as well. However, the coefficient should 
not be positive, the maximum statistically significant coefficient which this variable can reach 
should be 0. Since the contagion effect can be defined as the change in competitors’ value which 
cannot be attributed to wealth redistribution from the bankrupt firm, it would not be theoretical 
coherent to have a positive coefficient for the regression’s constant. For the ‘Industry Dummies’ 
the effect should be coherent with the ‘Degree of Competition’ for that specific industry, 
meaning if the competition is high in a given industry, the coefficient of the dummy variable 
should also be null; if it is low, the dummy’s coefficient should be negative. 
Finally, the following regression sums up the methodology. 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑖 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑖 +  𝛽1 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑖 +  𝛽2 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑖
+ 𝐷1 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 (𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑜𝑟 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ) 𝑖 +  𝐷2 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖 
+ 𝐷3 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑜𝑟 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ) 𝑖 +  𝛽3 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑖
+  𝛽4 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖 +  𝜀 𝑖 
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4. Results 
4.1 Abnormal returns for each industry in the sample 
First of all, after combining each firm into an industry, I obtained the 11-days daily returns for 
each industry. The following table presents the returns obtained. 
 
Table 3: Industry daily reaction to a bankruptcy inside that industry. 
This table includes all the bankruptcies in the United States of America between January 1990 
and December 2018, excluding firms which were too small to cause a meaningful impact on 
the industry performance, i.e. liabilities under $10 million. The number of bankruptcies is 152. 
After obtaining the values for each bankrupt firm, I organized them by industry using the 
Standard Industrial Classification Code and afterwards I simply averaged the returns for each 
day within each industry, obtaining this way the average daily return for the time span in 
analysis: the previous and after 5 days of an effective bankruptcy. Excess returns are expressed 
in percentage. Statistical significance of the returns is represented as follows: *** p<0.01, ** 





1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 
-5 -0.05 0.23 0.23 0.26 -0.34* 0.25 0.08 0.21 
-4 -0.27* -0.15* -0.24 0.34 0.32 0.09 -0.20** 0.65* 
-3 0.59 0.06 -0.34 0.30 0.22 0.27 0.24 0.37 
-2 0.81* 0.05 0.32 0.00 -0.22 -0.09 0.10 0.23 
-1 0.12 0.51 -0.13* -0.43* 0.26 0.08 -0.08 0.13 
0 -0.05 -0.32* -0.36* 0.00 -0.07 -0.17* -0.48*** -0.08 
1 -0.98*** -0.04 0.22 0.35 0.11 -0.33** 0.14 -0.07 
2 0.45 0.14 0.02 0.03 -0.10 -0.36** 0.34 -0.34 
3 0.08 -0.20 -0.20 -0.27* 0.00 0.12 0.09 -0.60* 
4 -0.51** 0.35 0.05 0.28 -0.18 0.19 -0.12 -1.16*** 
5 0.03 0.10 0.32 0.36* -0.16 0.20 0.30 0.20 
 
 
As one can see from the table above, on the day of the effective bankruptcy all industries present 
a negative return on that day, excluding “Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and 
Sanitary service” with 0% on that day, which vary from -0.48% (statistically significant at 1%) 
on “Services” to -0.05% on “Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Mining and Construction”. 
However, an interesting finding with respect to industry 6000 – “Finance, Insurance and Real 
Estate” is that the day of the effective bankruptcy and the 2 following days present a return of 
-0.17%, -0.33% and -0.36%, respectively. It is important to notice that the day 0 is statistically 
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significant at 10%, while the two following days are at 1%. This implies an average return for 
the 3 days of -0.28%. 
Despite the fact that on the previous and after days of the bankruptcy, the returns seem to act 
randomly, confirming the suspicious of the stock market adjusting on the day of the 
announcement and not on the day of the actual bankruptcy, the day 0 presents a negative, or 
null in one case, return which I will exploit with the following methodology. 
Subsequently, I averaged the daily returns per industry to check the 11-day performance after 
a bankruptcy. Since the values were not consistent between each other, meaning some were 
positive some were negative (no arising opportunities from this fact), varying between -0.04% 
(the only statistically significant return at 10%) on “Services” and 0.11% on “Transportation, 
Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary service”, I shortened the time span to 3 days (one 
day before and one day after the bankruptcy) and interesting values showed up.  
Excluding two industries that present positive returns (“Manufacturing”, 0.05% and 
“Wholesale Trade, Retail Trade”, 0.10%), the 3-day average return present negative results, 
such as -0.31% for “Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Mining and Construction”, -0.09% for 
“Manufacturing” and -0.14% for “Finance, Insurance and Real Estate” and “Services”, all 
statistically significant.  
To check whether the returns are statistically significant or not on the period of a bankruptcy, I 
compared to a non-event industry performance, using the 49 Industry Portfolio: the average of 
five random samples of 11 days, excluding the previous and after 5 days of a bankruptcy, 
compared to the excess returns obtained from an actual bankruptcy.  
The following table presents the Excess Returns (ER) and the number of bankruptcies for each 
industry. Statistical significance of the returns is represented as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1, where ‘p’ stands for p-value. 
 
Table 4: 11 and 3-days average industry reaction to a bankruptcy. 
The following table presents the 11 and 3-days average industry excess returns to a bankruptcy. 
I averaged the daily values previously obtained in Table 3, obtaining the 11-day excess return, 
being the 6th day, the effective day of the bankruptcy. Also, I was interested in checking the 
effect for a shorter time span: the 3-day average return. Therefore, I used the 2nd day as the 
effective day of the bankruptcy. 
Excess returns are expressed in percentage. Statistical significance of the returns is represented 














Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Mining and 
Construction 
1000 4 0.02 -0.31* 
Manufacturing 
2000 12 0.07 0.05 
3000 36 -0.01 -0.09* 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and 
Sanitary service 
4000 11 0.11 -0.02 
Wholesale Trade, Retail Trade 5000 18 -0.01 0.10 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 6000 30 0.02 -0.14** 
Services 
7000 31 0.04 -0.14** 
8000 10 -0.04* -0.01 
Public Administration 9000 0 - - 
Total - 152 - - 
 
Unfortunately, there was no other combination of days that would provide better results than 
the Excess Returns 3-days average, i.e. other combinations, such as the 5-day average, would 
provide positive or null returns and not statistically significant. 
 
4.2 Regression 
As previously mentioned, my multivariate analysis is based on the following regression:  
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑖 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑖 +  𝛽1 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑖 +  𝛽2 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑖
+ 𝐷1 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 (𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑜𝑟 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ) 𝑖 +  𝐷2 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖 
+ 𝐷3 𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑜𝑟 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ) 𝑖 +  𝛽3 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑖
+  𝛽4 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖 +  𝜀 𝑖 
 
The output of the regression is expressed on the following figure and it was extracted from 
Stata. Robust standard errors are represented in parentheses and the statistical significance of 
the coefficient of the variables is represented as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, where 
‘p’ stands for p-value. Also, the summary statistics and correlation matrix of these variables 
can be found on the appendix. 
 
Table 5: Regression's output. 
This table includes all the bankruptcies in the United States of America between January 1990 
and December 2018, excluding firms which were too small to cause a meaningful impact on 
the industry performance, i.e. liabilities under $10 million. The number of bankruptcies is 152. 
The number of observations was 575 with an average of 4 observations per company, i.e. on 
average every bankrupt firm have their last 4 quarterly trading days present in the regression to 
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capture the characteristics which made the firm go bankrupt. Statistical significance is 




    
Current Ratio 0.014 
 (0.012) 
Assets over Liabilities -0.008 
 (0.011) 
Leverage Ratio 0.046 
 (0.057) 
Cash over Debt 0.000** 
 (0.000) 
Industry 1000 0.098 
 (0.097) 
Industry 2000 0.069 
 (0.131) 
Industry 3000 -0.185* 
 (0.100) 
Industry 4000 -0.154*** 
 (0.027) 
Industry 5000 -0.291*** 
 (0.052) 
Industry 6000 -0.067 
 (0.110) 
Industry 7000 -0.005 
 (0.014) 
Degree of Competition = High -0.081* 
 (0.047) 
Degree of Competition = Low -0.137*** 
 (0.042) 
Leverage Ratio Dummy = Low -0.042 
 (0.105) 










The number of observations was 575, for the 152 companies with an average of 4 observations 
per company, i.e. on average every bankrupt firm have their last 4 quarterly trading days present 
in the regression to capture the characteristics which made the firm go bankrupt.  
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Some variables are not statistically nor economically significant. Taking the ‘Leverage Ratio’ 
into consideration, independent of the amount of debt the firm choses to have, it will not affect 
the market returns after the bankruptcy. This can be explained by the fact that the lenders of the 
firm are not in the same industry as the bankrupt firm, therefore their competitors will not suffer 
a higher or lower impact depending on the leverage because they do not have this kind of 
business ties, except in the case of banks. This can also be confirmed by the statistically 
significant coefficient of the ratio ‘Cash over Debt’: it is -0.00023. It matters minimally for the 
other firms inside that industry if the firm could pay its debts with their available cash or not, 
since it will almost not affect their performance when a bankruptcy occurs. Also, the ‘Current 
Ratio’ and the ‘Assets over Liabilities’ do not have an impact on the industry performance. 
Yet, the ‘Degree of Competition’ matters for the industry performance after a bankruptcy, i.e. 
it is statistically significant. It reduces the industry returns on the effective day of the bankruptcy 
in a presence of a low or high ‘Degree of Competition’ by -0.137% and -0.081%, respectively. 
This finding supports partially the competition effect through the variable ‘Degree of 
Competition’, i.e., on this research, I was able to prove the negative effect for highly 
competitive industries in line with Lang and Stulz (1992), with the same happening to industries 
with a low degree of competition as opposed to the authors. 
Regarding the industry itself, three industries reveal a statistically significant negative effect 
when a bankruptcy occurs inside that industry: 3000 – “Manufacturing”, 4000 – 
“Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary service” and 5000 – “Wholesale 
Trade, Retail Trade”. In the day of an effective bankruptcy, those industries report a return of -
0.185%, -0.154% and -0.291%, respectively. These findings go accordingly with the results 
presented by Lang and Stulz (1992) regarding “the abnormal returns for each industry in the 
sample” study. 
The constant of the regression is used as a proxy for the contagion effect. However, the results 
show inconsistency with the results found by Lang and Stulz (1992): there is no presence of 
contagion effect on the bankruptcies analyzed. Since the contagion effect can be defined as the 
change in competitors’ value which cannot be attributed to wealth redistribution from the 
bankrupt firm, one can state that a positive statistically significant coefficient would not be 
coherent with the theory supporting this effect. Thus, a null value is in line with the theory, 
however does not support the findings of Lang and Stulz (1992). 
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4.3 Limitations and further research 
The access to some databases, which had the day of the announcement and the day of the 
effective bankruptcy (such as bankruptcydata.com), were paid and since they did not provide 
me with the information I needed in order to have a more complete analysis regarding the effects 
on the returns on both days, I would propose for future studies the beforementioned analysis. It 
is important to understand if the contagion effect proved by Lang and Stulz (1992) between 
1970 and 1989 still stands nowadays and if this is an isolated case in the United States or if this 
also applies to other regions, especially Europe, since Frino, Jones and Wong (2007) were not 
able to prove the announcement effect for Australia.  
Moreover, some effects such as counterparty and cascade were not analyzed in this dissertation 
due to the lack of information on the databases used (CRSP and Compustat).  
Another limitation was the fact that there are not studies performed only on the effective day 
of the bankruptcy. The previous literature focused on the day of the announcement and on the 
effects to the market. I consider that an isolated analysis of this event would be relevant, since 
the day of the filling to Chapter 7 is not publicly known and the effective the firm stops trading 
on the stock market is, and one can take advantage of this fact. 
Also, as banks’ failures are not covered in this dissertation since there are heavily regulated due 
to the consequences they can have on the economy of the country where the bankruptcy 
happened, it would be interesting to see the effect inside the industry (where it is included other 
financial institutions, insurance companies and real estate firms) and on other industries with 
and without business ties to the failed bank, when controlled for the macroeconomic 












5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper provides evidence that an effective bankruptcy has a competitive effect, negative to 
the returns, on other firms in the same industry independently of having a low or high degree 
of competition inside that industry (using the Herfindahl index as a proxy for the degree of 
competition within an industry). However, the results could not support the contagion effect on 
the effective day of the bankruptcy.  
The competitive effect reduces the industry returns on the effective day of the bankruptcy in a 
presence of a low or high ‘Degree of Competition’ by -0.137% and -0.081%, respectively, both 
statistically significant. I was able to prove the negative effect for highly competitive industries 
in line with Lang and Stulz (1992), with the same happening to industries with a low degree of 
competition as opposed to the authors.  
The constant of the regression is used as a proxy for the contagion effect. However, the results 
show inconsistency with the results found by Lang and Stulz (1992): there is no presence of 
contagion effect on the bankruptcies analyzed. Since the contagion effect can be defined as the 
change in competitors’ value which cannot be attributed to wealth redistribution from the 
bankrupt firm, one can state that a positive statistically significant coefficient would not be 
coherent with the theory supporting this effect. Thus, a null value, as the one found on this 
research, is in line with the theory, however does not support the findings of Lang and Stulz 
(1992). 
I found that the leverage ratio, independent of the amount of debt the firm choses to have, will 
not affect the market returns after the bankruptcy. This can be explained by the fact that the 
lenders of the firm are not in the same industry as the bankrupt firm, therefore their competitors 
will not suffer a higher or lower impact depending on the leverage because they do not have 
this kind of business ties. This can also be confirmed by the statistically significant coefficient 
of the ratio ‘Cash over Debt’: it is -0.00023. It matters minimally for the other firms inside that 
industry if the firm could pay its debts with their available cash or not, since it will almost not 
affect their performance when a bankruptcy occurs. Also, the ‘Current Ratio’ and the ‘Assets 
over Liabilities’ do not have an impact on the industry performance. 
Regarding the industry itself, three reveal a statistically significant negative effect when a 
bankruptcy occurs inside that industry: 3000 – “Manufacturing”, 4000 – “Transportation, 
Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary service” and 5000 – “Wholesale Trade, Retail 
Trade”. In the day of an effective bankruptcy, those industries report a return of -0.185%, -
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0.154% and -0.291%, respectively, all statistically significant. These findings go accordingly 
with the results presented by Lang and Stulz (1992) regarding “the abnormal returns for each 
industry in the sample” study. 
On the day of the effective bankruptcy all industries present a negative return on that day, 
excluding “Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary service” with 0% on 
that day, which vary from -0.48% (statistically significant at 1%) on “Services” to -0.05% on 
“Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Mining and Construction”. However, an interesting finding 
with respect to industry 6000 – “Finance, Insurance and Real Estate” is that the day of the 
effective bankruptcy and the 2 following days present a return of -0.17%, -0.33% and -0.36%, 
respectively. It is important to notice that the day 0 is statistically significant at 10%, while the 
two following days are at 1%. This implies an average excess return for the 3 days of -0.28%. 
I performed a 3-day analysis (one day before and one day after the bankruptcy) and, excluding 
two industries which presented positive returns (“Manufacturing”, 0.05% and “Wholesale 
Trade, Retail Trade”, 0.10%), the 3-day average return present negative results, such as -0.31% 
for “Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Mining and Construction”, -0.09% for “Manufacturing” 
and -0.14% for “Finance, Insurance and Real Estate” and “Services”, all statistically significant. 
The objective of this dissertation is to check if the market also reacts to an extinction of a firm 
on the effective day of the bankruptcy or if the market (only) reacts on the day of the 
announcement, as proven by several authors such as Lang and Stulz (1992). Since the day of 
the announcement can be unpredictable, therefore one cannot extract a benefit from it. 
However, if the market also reacts to the extinguish of a firm on the effective day of the 
bankruptcy (which is known after the firm’s filling), there is a possibility to take advantage of 
it. As one can see from the above results, it is possible to do so for some specific industries and 
days. The most interesting result is for industry 6000 – “Finance, Insurance and Real Estate” 
which has average excess return for the 3 days of -0.28%, which provides evidence to the 
hypothesis that the market reacts on the announcement and on the effective day of the 
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7. Appendices  
 
Table 6: Daily industry reaction to a bankruptcy for each firm. 
The returns are expressed in percentage. This table includes all the bankruptcies in the United 
States of America between January 1990 and December 2018, excluding firms which were too 
small to cause a meaningful impact on the industry performance, i.e. liabilities under $10 
million. The number of bankruptcies is 152.  
 
 Day relative to the bankruptcy 
Firms -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
1310 0,03 -1,39 -1,02 -0,06 0,55 -0,40 0,63 1,08 1,99 0,45 -0,13 
1731 0,89 1,26 1,09 0,88 1,49 0,02 -2,83 1,94 -0,59 -0,80 -0,11 
1730 -0,07 -0,41 1,91 0,40 2,37 -0,32 -1,08 -0,63 0,14 -0,04 -0,23 
1040 -1,05 -0,54 0,37 2,03 -3,94 0,49 -0,64 -0,59 -1,23 -1,64 0,59 
2830 -0,57 -3,82 -0,85 0,70 0,12 -0,78 -1,64 -0,20 -0,76 0,37 1,03 
2834 1,45 -0,27 0,41 -0,02 -0,32 0,70 0,58 0,89 -0,27 1,05 -0,22 
2760 -0,57 -0,33 0,91 -1,22 -0,61 0,22 0,16 -0,55 -1,50 2,65 0,08 
2730 -2,33 0,99 1,98 -0,98 1,62 -1,58 1,62 -0,80 2,93 -1,42 0,22 
2250 0,65 1,04 -0,62 -2,34 1,25 -0,48 0,29 0,49 -0,47 -1,58 0,48 
2850 2,57 0,97 0,94 -0,10 0,66 -0,21 -0,78 -0,34 -0,68 -0,41 -1,15 
2730 0,73 0,49 0,24 0,19 0,37 0,12 -0,04 0,51 0,63 2,47 0,42 
2830 3,09 -0,24 0,52 -0,28 -0,19 -0,21 0,28 0,22 0,32 -0,52 0,22 
2830 -0,49 -0,06 0,52 -0,83 0,45 0,07 0,60 0,86 -0,17 0,10 0,44 
2360 -0,09 0,10 0,18 0,11 1,18 -0,99 1,01 0,14 1,49 -0,16 0,14 
2730 -0,01 -1,27 -1,40 1,81 3,62 -0,78 -2,43 0,39 -2,47 -1,09 -0,42 
2080 -1,63 0,61 -2,11 3,56 -1,99 0,08 -0,17 0,10 -1,42 2,70 0,01 
3674 -0,27 0,16 -0,03 0,17 0,67 -0,33 -1,23 -0,59 -0,45 0,15 -0,73 
3570 0,03 0,97 0,27 0,18 0,45 -0,78 -0,65 -1,41 -0,01 0,07 -0,37 
3830 0,75 1,11 0,24 1,07 0,30 -0,15 1,15 -1,03 -0,17 0,13 0,24 
3710 -0,05 -0,07 -1,52 0,53 -0,37 -0,34 1,16 -0,32 -0,24 0,48 0,02 
3570 1,92 -1,16 0,79 1,05 -1,65 0,25 -0,93 0,78 1,14 -0,61 -0,16 
3460 -0,94 -3,28 -0,77 1,33 0,28 0,31 -0,15 1,83 -0,39 -1,89 0,61 
3730 0,04 -0,91 1,67 -1,43 -1,59 0,27 -0,07 -0,19 -0,78 2,24 -0,11 
3644 0,26 1,23 1,51 -0,40 0,03 0,18 -0,52 1,61 0,83 -0,54 -0,69 
3560 -2,84 -1,64 -1,97 -0,36 -0,81 1,71 -2,03 -1,38 1,12 0,72 1,75 
3660 2,82 2,05 -4,17 1,50 3,08 1,76 -1,79 0,29 -3,07 -0,98 -1,29 
3660 1,67 1,68 0,43 -0,48 -0,03 -3,72 1,94 -1,60 -0,46 0,64 0,76 
3660 0,37 0,90 0,40 -0,12 1,55 -1,64 1,83 -0,33 0,11 0,51 1,43 
3820 2,66 -2,12 -3,40 -1,27 -0,72 -3,51 -0,07 -0,71 -3,85 -1,66 0,49 
3640 0,66 0,72 0,73 -0,02 0,66 0,91 0,69 0,63 0,86 1,40 0,45 
3860 -0,87 -1,15 0,11 -0,22 -0,52 0,62 -0,69 0,47 0,20 0,13 0,45 
3860 0,34 -0,87 -0,94 0,82 0,91 -0,45 0,26 0,64 -0,77 -0,92 0,46 
27 
3560 -1,07 -0,69 3,15 -0,40 -2,10 -0,98 -0,88 1,40 -1,01 -0,97 1,94 
3470 -0,94 -3,28 -0,77 1,33 0,28 0,31 -0,15 1,83 -0,39 -1,89 0,61 
3660 1,62 1,54 -1,11 0,30 1,53 -1,20 0,66 -0,55 -1,14 0,06 0,30 
3570 0,93 -0,74 -1,22 0,06 0,66 -1,51 0,57 0,06 -1,32 -0,75 0,71 
3710 0,93 -0,61 -0,52 0,06 -0,52 -2,58 0,88 -0,52 -1,32 -0,58 0,71 
3570 1,52 -0,61 -1,50 -0,70 0,42 -2,58 0,88 -0,52 -1,87 -0,58 0,96 
3670 2,43 0,40 1,67 1,96 -0,43 0,71 1,79 -0,22 0,14 0,64 2,38 
3690 -3,99 3,36 0,49 0,31 -3,48 2,08 2,56 -0,61 2,70 3,09 -1,16 
3570 -0,02 1,05 0,22 0,53 -1,17 0,07 1,74 -0,45 0,32 1,05 0,73 
3630 -0,74 0,11 -0,42 -0,13 -0,03 2,02 0,47 -0,50 0,60 0,53 0,59 
3070 -0,38 0,58 -0,10 0,20 -0,60 1,05 1,11 -0,48 0,46 0,79 0,66 
3144 0,19 0,05 -0,34 0,50 0,68 -0,61 -0,20 -0,38 -0,39 -0,42 0,04 
3651 0,34 -0,87 -0,94 0,82 0,91 -0,45 0,26 0,64 -0,77 -0,92 0,46 
3572 0,03 0,97 0,27 0,18 0,45 -0,78 -0,65 -1,41 -0,01 0,07 -0,37 
3851 0,34 -0,97 0,36 0,68 -0,08 -1,47 -0,88 1,31 -0,68 1,04 -0,63 
3490 0,12 0,22 -0,08 -0,19 -1,20 -0,32 0,98 0,51 0,81 0,70 0,59 
3620 0,23 -0,38 0,14 0,25 -0,64 -0,90 0,05 0,91 0,07 0,87 -0,02 
3720 1,45 -0,39 -0,39 0,35 0,03 -1,49 1,03 -0,30 -1,09 -0,31 1,19 
3444 -0,94 -3,28 -0,77 1,33 0,28 0,31 -0,15 1,83 -0,39 -1,89 0,61 
3312 -0,23 -2,60 -3,72 1,61 -1,89 0,13 -1,04 -0,47 3,87 1,41 -1,95 
4720 0,60 3,15 0,30 0,02 0,12 -0,17 1,04 -0,21 1,03 0,80 0,12 
4960 0,12 -0,13 -0,40 0,25 -3,38 -0,58 2,00 0,13 0,19 -0,24 0,05 
4950 0,12 1,68 -0,91 -0,38 1,78 1,90 1,02 0,95 -1,54 -0,87 0,39 
4010 -0,71 -1,17 1,08 -0,11 0,69 -0,01 1,13 -0,24 -0,01 0,25 1,07 
4940 0,11 0,09 0,03 0,44 0,04 0,17 0,13 -0,88 -0,06 0,19 0,15 
4510 2,12 2,25 0,45 -2,04 -0,96 -0,83 2,55 -0,86 0,03 0,33 1,41 
4950 -1,10 0,21 0,53 0,88 -0,62 -0,91 -1,63 0,12 -0,43 0,12 1,68 
4840 0,66 -0,37 0,45 0,28 0,57 -0,20 -0,82 1,18 -1,79 1,88 -0,28 
4910 -0,22 -0,08 0,49 0,58 -0,03 -0,56 -1,23 0,65 -1,11 1,00 0,70 
4840 -0,16 -1,86 0,17 -0,48 -2,29 0,69 -0,80 -2,15 -0,33 -0,47 -1,33 
4950 1,32 0,00 1,09 0,58 -0,68 0,55 0,50 1,68 1,09 0,04 0,04 
5650 -0,02 0,15 -0,05 -0,70 -0,39 0,28 0,23 0,21 0,02 0,77 -0,58 
5030 -1,07 0,31 -0,64 -0,30 0,33 -1,22 -0,01 -1,22 -0,29 -0,58 -0,52 
5072 0,85 0,14 0,29 0,41 0,78 -0,17 0,44 0,33 -0,42 -0,52 0,24 
5960 -3,11 -1,40 3,56 1,52 -1,11 -1,74 -1,48 0,36 0,49 0,99 -0,39 
5810 0,27 2,02 -1,49 -1,07 1,55 2,23 -0,42 0,43 0,63 -0,51 -1,68 
5940 0,99 0,75 0,24 0,23 0,90 -0,21 -0,73 -0,15 1,20 0,55 1,05 
5730 -1,11 -0,32 1,07 0,54 0,00 -1,04 -0,35 -0,18 -0,07 -0,04 -0,22 
5960 -0,62 0,24 0,33 -0,03 0,23 -0,12 -0,25 0,02 0,09 0,03 -0,59 
5060 -0,17 0,09 0,36 0,16 0,96 0,38 1,37 0,06 0,57 -0,36 -0,52 
5620 0,56 1,82 1,01 1,10 -1,23 0,77 1,03 -2,57 -3,46 -0,97 -0,14 
5990 0,33 -0,69 0,87 -0,60 0,48 0,69 0,14 0,51 0,27 -1,16 -0,87 
5661 -1,93 0,76 -1,25 -0,89 -0,73 0,18 0,06 -0,36 1,21 -0,51 0,93 
5990 -1,10 0,79 0,50 -0,26 0,76 0,74 1,00 -0,06 0,38 -1,36 0,48 
28 
5090 -0,06 0,22 0,66 0,39 0,45 -0,63 -0,54 -0,16 0,56 0,26 0,41 
5810 -0,86 -0,04 0,70 0,26 0,12 -0,58 -0,30 -0,08 0,01 0,00 -0,40 
5940 -0,55 0,23 -0,35 -0,50 -0,03 -0,47 0,11 -0,51 -0,14 0,10 -0,55 
5620 1,79 0,26 0,39 -4,76 1,16 -1,76 0,10 0,46 -0,62 -0,27 1,01 
5960 -0,30 0,47 -2,28 0,55 0,44 1,41 1,53 1,11 -0,44 0,31 -0,53 
6020 -0,81 0,53 -0,13 -1,14 -0,49 -1,49 -1,85 -1,85 -1,97 -2,82 -1,31 
6710 0,55 -0,16 -0,30 0,43 0,57 1,23 0,36 -0,13 0,59 0,26 0,16 
6726 -0,06 0,26 0,33 -0,60 -0,48 1,31 -1,81 -0,84 0,12 0,80 0,16 
6020 0,38 0,71 0,16 -0,32 1,74 0,66 -0,42 -1,17 -0,24 -0,35 2,21 
6020 0,80 -0,50 1,63 0,59 -0,09 0,65 0,73 0,91 -0,48 -0,51 1,75 
6610 -0,73 -0,02 0,48 -0,09 -0,04 -0,11 0,61 0,39 0,26 0,36 0,90 
6610 0,88 -0,34 0,51 -1,03 -1,11 -0,09 0,53 -0,89 0,90 -0,54 0,65 
6020 1,56 1,08 1,16 -0,53 -0,55 -0,80 -0,33 0,21 1,29 0,12 0,14 
6140 -0,46 -2,06 0,31 -0,62 0,11 -0,99 -1,42 -0,04 0,53 0,43 0,22 
6710 -0,02 -0,12 -2,08 -0,62 -0,61 1,40 -0,57 -2,02 0,50 1,08 2,58 
6020 -0,90 0,43 0,55 0,07 -0,24 -1,91 -0,58 0,59 -0,78 1,09 -0,34 
6020 0,14 0,45 0,22 1,01 1,77 0,03 -1,47 -0,33 0,34 0,20 0,88 
6160 0,27 -0,35 0,11 0,81 2,12 0,25 -1,74 0,12 0,49 -0,16 1,19 
6710 0,00 1,24 0,33 1,20 1,42 -0,19 -1,20 -0,78 0,19 0,56 0,57 
6220 -0,46 -2,06 0,31 -0,62 0,11 -0,99 -1,42 -0,04 0,53 0,43 0,22 
6331 0,09 -2,36 -0,22 -1,17 -0,87 0,96 0,69 -0,64 0,17 0,89 0,17 
6710 0,46 1,02 0,48 0,48 0,43 0,06 -0,30 -0,06 0,40 0,29 -0,17 
6020 0,67 -0,43 -0,54 0,67 -0,03 -0,36 0,38 -0,83 -0,78 1,26 -3,00 
6411 0,57 0,30 -0,03 0,58 0,20 -0,15 0,04 -0,45 -0,19 0,78 -1,59 
6020 -0,46 -0,58 -0,41 -0,39 -0,25 -0,50 -0,86 -0,49 0,08 0,87 0,82 
6550 0,57 0,30 -0,03 0,58 0,20 -0,15 0,04 -0,45 -0,19 0,78 -1,59 
6020 1,22 0,37 0,84 -0,78 -0,83 -0,45 0,10 -0,34 1,10 -0,21 0,40 
6710 0,51 -0,01 -0,03 0,13 -0,14 -0,32 -0,06 -0,51 0,00 0,69 -0,99 
6030 0,47 0,09 0,09 -0,01 -0,17 -0,31 -0,17 -0,43 0,20 0,55 -0,49 
6710 0,44 0,03 0,13 -0,20 -0,29 -0,37 -0,24 -0,43 0,33 0,48 -0,12 
6030 0,89 0,33 0,40 -0,10 -0,32 -0,30 0,07 -0,39 0,45 0,28 -0,60 
6020 -0,54 1,46 3,47 0,42 -0,01 -0,84 1,67 1,13 1,02 -0,37 0,45 
6310 0,53 1,02 0,10 -0,48 0,10 -0,42 -0,22 -0,35 -0,47 -0,54 0,86 
6710 -0,16 -0,13 -0,57 -0,02 0,10 0,18 0,29 -0,09 0,08 -0,63 0,16 
6030 1,21 2,17 0,76 -0,93 0,09 -1,02 -0,73 -0,61 -1,02 -0,45 1,56 
7370 -0,40 -1,81 0,22 0,69 -0,76 -0,27 1,13 0,75 0,68 -0,47 0,27 
7370 0,10 0,10 0,58 0,33 0,02 -0,33 -0,94 0,63 1,06 0,73 -0,67 
7372 -0,15 -0,86 0,40 0,51 -0,37 -0,30 0,10 0,69 0,87 0,13 -0,20 
7370 0,29 0,59 1,46 -0,14 0,25 0,47 0,33 1,13 0,32 0,23 0,27 
7990 0,22 0,08 0,14 -0,09 -0,19 -0,37 0,23 0,02 -0,09 -0,52 0,66 
7373 0,12 -0,06 0,67 0,09 -0,10 -0,07 0,22 0,61 0,37 -0,05 0,24 
7922 0,07 -0,13 0,93 0,19 -0,06 0,09 0,21 0,91 0,60 0,18 0,04 
7010 0,08 1,41 0,87 0,35 -1,45 -0,34 -0,87 0,74 0,64 1,51 0,41 
7372 -0,23 0,33 0,80 -0,35 0,30 -1,07 0,25 0,54 1,40 -0,20 0,39 
29 
7350 1,02 1,60 0,12 1,80 0,37 0,93 0,33 0,37 0,49 0,85 0,75 
7389 -0,62 -0,12 0,35 0,90 -0,62 -1,95 -1,73 -0,41 -1,80 0,98 1,43 
7370 0,29 0,56 -0,15 0,13 -0,03 0,21 0,68 0,12 -0,13 -0,03 0,52 
7370 -0,70 -0,21 0,14 1,07 -0,11 0,94 -0,09 0,50 -0,06 -0,28 -0,04 
7350 -3,91 -0,76 -3,75 1,94 -3,56 0,13 -1,15 -0,79 0,76 0,08 0,46 
7370 0,39 -0,17 -0,99 0,23 -0,50 -0,67 0,48 1,28 -0,58 0,30 1,65 
7370 0,71 -0,25 -0,16 -0,85 -0,87 -1,69 -0,44 -0,90 -1,49 -1,01 1,06 
7370 0,27 -0,59 0,87 -0,05 0,20 0,34 1,31 0,46 0,15 -0,74 -1,11 
7350 0,77 -0,64 0,65 -1,23 0,81 -2,52 0,66 0,43 0,35 0,77 0,55 
7810 -0,35 -0,48 -0,68 0,01 -0,22 -0,40 0,63 0,10 -0,16 -0,12 0,52 
7360 0,54 -0,41 0,09 -0,48 0,36 -0,54 -0,45 0,32 -0,39 -0,17 0,54 
7310 0,58 -0,49 0,45 -0,71 0,05 -1,29 -0,98 0,00 -0,33 -0,33 0,17 
7370 0,52 -0,62 0,76 -0,64 0,51 -1,09 0,99 0,45 0,25 0,02 -0,28 
7372 -0,07 0,15 0,26 0,62 0,58 0,00 -0,55 0,54 0,02 -1,18 0,91 
7390 0,34 -0,32 0,49 -0,24 0,38 -0,79 0,32 0,33 -0,02 -0,50 0,27 
7380 0,23 -0,23 0,51 -0,01 0,54 -0,55 0,22 0,49 0,14 -0,58 0,32 
7299 -0,22 -0,05 1,33 -0,23 0,10 -0,24 0,05 1,04 0,27 -0,50 -0,18 
7372 0,92 -0,14 0,19 0,81 0,49 -0,49 -0,56 -0,57 0,30 -1,05 1,09 
7820 0,36 -1,12 -0,44 0,30 0,31 0,11 1,80 0,05 -0,47 -1,34 -1,05 
7380 0,32 -0,50 0,16 -0,45 0,48 -0,83 0,66 0,21 -0,16 -0,15 0,24 
7370 0,55 -0,51 0,44 -0,61 0,30 -0,97 0,67 0,25 -0,16 -0,16 0,14 
7810 0,55 -0,55 0,61 -0,68 0,28 -1,19 0,75 0,22 -0,04 -0,16 -0,06 
8240 -0,30 1,54 -0,29 2,64 0,71 0,22 -0,86 0,11 0,75 -0,80 0,66 
8080 0,06 0,76 0,88 0,76 0,36 -1,00 -0,84 -0,37 -0,88 -0,81 1,08 
8300 0,15 -0,16 1,07 -0,78 0,99 0,33 0,36 0,76 0,19 -1,20 0,87 
8730 0,14 0,32 0,31 -0,71 0,41 0,47 0,57 0,17 0,23 0,28 -0,35 
8740 0,12 0,31 0,75 -0,24 0,59 -0,07 0,03 0,19 -0,15 -0,58 0,53 
8742 -0,12 1,15 0,30 1,70 0,54 -0,39 -0,85 -0,13 -0,07 -0,81 0,87 
8070 1,21 0,64 0,43 -1,36 -1,37 -0,80 0,07 -1,59 -3,31 -5,08 -1,61 
8730 0,40 0,70 0,49 0,03 -0,08 -0,42 -0,25 -0,51 -1,18 -2,15 -0,07 
8090 -0,08 0,35 -0,64 0,05 -0,47 1,47 1,48 -1,20 0,12 2,48 0,34 













Table 7: Summary statistics. 
This table includes all the bankruptcies in the United States of America between January 1990 
and December 2018, excluding firms which were too small to cause a meaningful impact on 
the industry performance, i.e. liabilities under $10 million. The number of bankruptcies is 152. 
The number of observations was 575 with an average of 4 observations per company, i.e. on 
average every bankrupt firm have their last 4 quarterly trading days present in the regression to 
capture the characteristics which made the firm go bankrupt. 
 
Variables Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
Returns 575 -0.23 0.82 -4.51 4.53 
Current Ratio 575 2.83 5.63 0 68.17 
Assets over Liabilities 575 3.07 5.75 0.02 70.14 
Leverage Ratio 575 0.38 1.23 0 10.37 
Cash over Debt 575 8.36 159.18 0 3792.40 
Industry 1000 575 0.47 0.21 0 1 
Industry 2000 575 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Industry 3000 575 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Industry 4000 575 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Industry 5000 575 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Industry 6000 575 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Industry 7000 575 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Degree of Competition - 
High 575 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Degree of Competition - 
Low 575 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Leverage Ratio - High 575 0.83 0.37 0 1 










Table 8: Correlation matrix. 








































Returns 1.0000                
Current Ratio 0.0477 1.0000               
Assets over Liabilities 0.0430 0.9390 1.0000              
Leverage Ratio 0.0397 0.0078 -0.0997 1.0000             
Cash over Debt 0.0103 0.0376 0.0370 -0.0157 1.0000            
Industry 1000 0.0479 0.1280 0.1165 0.0847 -0.0109 1.0000           
Industry 2000 0.0426 0.0798 0.0434 0.1625 -0.0170 -0.0743 1.0000          
Industry 3000 -0.0790 0.0710 0.0391 0.0530 0.0742 -0.1547 -0.2334 1.0000         
Industry 4000 0.0135 0.139 0.1749 -0.0475 -0.0080 -0.0338 -0.0509 -0.1060 1.0000        
Industry 5000 -0.0522 -0.1159 -0.1483 -0.0737 -0.0284 -0.1200 -0.1810 -0.3767 -0.0822 1.0000       
Industry 6000 0.0161 -0.1578 -0.0909 -0.1105 -0.0183 -0.0786 -0.1185 -0.2467 -0.0538 -0.1913 1.0000      
Industry 7000 0.0520 -0.0526 -0.0368 -0.0121 -0.0186 -0.0806 -0.1216 -0.2531 -0.0552 -0.1963 -0.1285 1.0000     
Degree of Competition - High 0.0519 -0.1586 -0.0963 -0.0921 -0.0280 -0.1206 -0.1819 -0.3786 -0.0826 -0.2936 0.6515 0.6686 1.0000    
Degree of Competition - Low -0.0282 0.1690 0.1122 0.1837 0.0548 0.2335 0.3523 0.7331 -0.1446 -0.5139 -0.3365 -0.3453 -0.5164 1.0000   
Leverage Ratio - High -0.0179 0.0371 0.1098 -0.6920 0.0225 -0.1872 -0.0823 -0.0856 0.0681 0.0636 0.1584 -0.0118 0.1098 -0.2094 1.0000  
Leverage Ratio -Low 0.0249 0.0051 -0.0953 0.7825 -0.0181 0.2351 0.1202 0.0009 -0.0538 -0.0987 -0.1252 0.0611 -0.0472 0.1729 -0.7905 1.0000 
 
 
 
